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Embezzlement of resources is hampering public service delivery throughout the 
developing world. Research on this issue is hindered by problems of measurement. To 
overcome these problems we use an economic experiment to investigate the determinants 
of corrupt behaviour. We focus on three aspects of behaviour: (i) embezzlement by public 
servants; (ii) monitoring effort by designated monitors; and, (iii) voting by community 
members when provided with an opportunity to select a monitor. The experiment allows 
us to study the effect of wages, effort observability, rules for monitor assignment, and 
professional norms. Our experimental subjects are Ethiopian nursing students.  
We find that service providers who earn more embezzle less, although the effect is small. 
Embezzlement is also lower when observability (associated with the risk of being caught 
and sanctioned) is high, and when service providers face an elected rather than randomly 
selected monitor. Monitors put more effort into monitoring when they face re-election 
and when the public servant receives a higher wage. Communities re-elect monitors who 
put more effort into exposing embezzlement. Framing—whereby players are referred to 
as “health workers” and “community members” rather than by abstract labels—affects 
neither mean embezzlement nor mean monitoring effort, but significantly increases the 
variance in both. This suggests that different types of experimental subject respond 
differently to the framing, possibly because they adhere to different norms.  
   1
“I Solemnly and Sincerely Swear that Above All Else I Will Faithfully Serve The People.” 
 




Public servants often face a conflict between their private interests and the 
interests of the people they are hired to serve. Too great an emphasis on the former can 
manifest itself as inappropriate or corrupt behaviour, absenteeism, informal charging and 
misappropriation of equipment and other resources. Such behaviour is particularly 
prevalent in the developing world, although it is also a problem in many developed 
countries (see, e.g. Ensor and Duran-Moreno 2002). In this paper we focus on the 
misappropriation of resources by health workers in developing countries, and the choices 
made by those responsible for overseeing and sanctioning those workers. However, our 
methodology and, to some extent, our results are also applicable to public servants in 
other contexts.  
We are interested in identifying the causes of resource misappropriation and 
thereby contributing to the search for methods of combating corruption. The existing 
literature on corruption and the performance of public servants (briefly reviewed in 
section 2 below) identifies many possible causes. Three topics receive special attention: 
(i) poor pay for public servants, which may lead to corruption either on its own or in 
combination with notions of what is and is not fair; (ii) the institutional environment, 
including the ease with which the performance of health workers can be monitored and 
sanctioned, and the interests of those charged with the monitoring and sanctioning duties; 
and (iii) the intrinsic, internal, or personal motivation of the health workers, which may 
be based on innate other-regarding preferences, pro-social behavioural norms internalised 
during childhood or adolescence, or professional principals and codes of conduct 
assimilated during training or through association with other members of the same 
professional culture.  
In this paper, we explore these possible causes of corruption using an economic 
experiment based on a game specifically designed for this purpose (described in section 3 
below). We conducted our experiment with Ethiopian nursing students as subjects. Many 
of these students will ultimately work in precisely the context within which the particular 
form of petty corruption that we are interested in is prevalent. By involving them, rather 
than students from a Western university, we aim to improve the external validity of our 
                                                 
1 Civil Servants Proclamation Act, Federal Republic of Ethiopia, Federal Negarit Gazeta January 3, 
2002.   2
results, at least to the Ethiopian context (described in section 4 below). Some of our 
results confirm the findings of other research on similar issues that exploits cross-country 
data while others go significantly beyond what is possible to generate using such data 
(results presented in section 5).  
2. Literature  Review 
In the theoretical literature, public servants are seen as agents for multiple 
principals, including patients, communities, and government agencies. The focus of this 
literature is to design optimal institutions and contracts that exert effort from public 
servants on an appropriate set of tasks and deter them from opportunistic behaviour. 
Arrow (1963) made an early contribution on the incentive issues that arise due to the 
asymmetry of information between patients and providers. More recently Barnum, 
Kutzin, and Saxenian (1995); Gosden, Pederson, and Torgerson (1999); and Chaix-
Couturier and others (2000) have discussed the effects of different systems of provider 
payment on hospital performance and medical practice, while Goddard, Mannion, and 
Smith (2000); Martinez and Martineau (1998); and Mills (1997) have focused on the 
importance of observability and performance-related incentives in the context of public 
sector management reform.  
The principal agent model also provides the basis for much of the literature on 
corruption (Bardhan 1997; Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978). Here, the focus is on 
the trade-off between the expected costs and benefits of a corrupt act. Most models 
identify wages as an important determinant of corruption, with low salaries increasing its 
prevalence (Becker and Stigler 1974; Chand and Moene 1999; Mookherjee and Png 
1995). Low wages can also result in selection, whereby poor performers who are more 
likely to engage in rent seeking are attracted to the public sector (Besley and McLaren 
1993).  
Monitoring and sanctioning institutions impact on the expected cost of corruption. 
But they also introduce new conflicts of interest. Indeed, corruption can emerge because 
there are opportunities for mutually beneficial transactions between monitors and agents 
(Becker and Stigler 1974; Khalil and Lawarree 1995; Mookherjee and Png 1995). In most 
developing countries monitoring is the duty of (other) public servants who are themselves 
under-paid, under-motivated, and disinterested in the performance of public service 
providers. In the literature on decentralization, some have argued that community 
participation strengthens accountability and improves governance; others question this, 
pointing to the lack of salient capacity at the community level (Banfield 1979; Manor 
1999; Prud’homme 1995). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) aim to reconcile these views by   3
proposing that corruption may be less severe in highly centralized and decentralized 
states, than in states with an intermediate level of institutional centralization.  
Diverging from neo-classical economics, Deci (1975), Frey (1997), Lindenberg 
(2001), Tendler (1997), and others identify a lack of intrinsic, internal, or personal 
motivation as an important determinant of professional behaviour. They see such 
motivations, especially in the form of professional ethics or norms, as providing a basis 
for self-enforcement mechanisms.
2 This may work better in some types of organizations 
than in others, and may explain why NGOs or religious organizations may be more able 
to overcome agency problems (Glaeser and Shleifer 2001; Pauly 1987). Looking at 
worker motivation in general, Kreps (1997) and Franco, Bennet, and Kanfer (2002) 
suggest that a reliance on extrinsic incentives may undermine internal sources of 
motivation, while Segall argues that “market relationships present health care providers 
with perverse incentives and can do violence to the professional ethos of caring.”
 (Segall 
2000, p. 11)  
While this theoretical literature has generated many insights into the possible 
causes of corruption, empirical verification has proven difficult. Chiappori and Salanié 
(2002), for example, highlight the general mismatch between theoretical predictions and 
what is observed in terms of real contract forms. The former tend to be much more 
complex than the latter. Factors such as merit pay, group incentives, career concerns, and 
the possible role of professional cultures, norms and ethics only exacerbate this mismatch 
(Dixit 1997, 2001; Wilson 1989).  
With few exceptions (e.g. Ablo and Reinikka 1998; Fisman and Gatti 2000; 
Svensson 2003), empirical analysis of corruption has often been based on cross-country 
perception data.
3 This analysis has focused an a wide range of factors, including legal 
systems, socio-economic development, political rights and democracy, ethnic 
composition, dimensions and degrees of decentralization, political instability, openness to 
trade, and public sector salaries and recruitment policies (for a review, see Andvig and 
Fjelstad (2001)). Of particular interest to us here is the work of Van Rijkeghem and 
Weder (2001) who find that, although higher public servant salaries (relative to 
manufacturing wages) are associated with less corruption, those salaries would have to 
                                                 
2 The term intrinsic motivation is not always clearly defined. Kreps (1997) argues that in many cases 
what is referred to as intrinsic incentives may in fact be workers’ response to fuzzy extrinsic motivators 
such as fear of discharge or career concerns, but he also acknowledges that “true” intrinsic motivation may 
be an important factor in many contexts. A helpful (and pragmatic) definition comes from self-perception 
theory in psychological literature, where intrinsic motivation is the motivation that drives an individual to 
conduct a task whatever the external incentives. Extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, is the motivation 
that drives a person to conduct a task, whether she likes it or not, because of the external incentives.  
3 E.g. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.   4
increase dramatically to eradicate corrupt behaviour. Using alternative measures of public 
sector earnings, neither Treisman (2000) nor Rauch and Evans (2000) identify an effect 
on perceived corruption. Moreover, Rauch and Evans (2000) find that employment 
security and recruitment and promotion criteria may be of greater important. While 
interesting, these analyses have been subject to criticism on account of the unsatisfactory 
measurement of corruption and the potential endogeneity of public sector salaries.  
These results can be contrasted with studies that have focused specifically on 
opportunistic behaviour by health workers. These studies often have a substantial 
qualitative component, and tend to be based on small samples. Ferrinho and Van 
Lerberghe (2000, 2002) for example discuss the various coping strategies employed by 
health workers; Ferrinho and others (1998) analyse absenteeism; Ensor and Witter (2001) 
and Killingsworth and others (1999) discuss informal payments; McPake and others 
(1999) provide a detailed and quantified assessment of informal economic activities by 
health workers in Uganda.  
The primary hindrances to agent-level, quantitative analysis of corruption and 
embezzlement relate to measurement, and the lack of institutional variation across 
otherwise directly comparable contexts. One way to circumvent these problems is to rely 
on experimental techniques to explore the various possible causal relationships 
mentioned above. Bjorn and Schulze (2000) develop a principal-agent game in which the 
agent is offered a bribe by an exogenous party. Bribery yields a higher payoff for the 
agent but causes damage to the principal. They find that certain types (economists, men) 
are more corrupt than others, but that the relationship is complex.
4 They also find that 
agents are no less corrupt if they are paid more (independent of the bribe). Abbink and 
others (2002) developed and Abbink (2002a; 2002b) applied a game in which one actor 
(a firm) can choose to bribe another (a public servant), who may accept or reject the 
bribe. There is a fixed probability of detection, whereby both players are disqualified 
from the game and loose any prospect of further earnings. Abbink finds that reciprocity 
can support bribery and that the threat of disqualification significantly reduces corruption. 
The results suggest that higher wages do not reduce corruption, although corruption may 
be motivated by fairness considerations and that rotation of staff reduces collusion and 
hence corruption. Complementary evidence from one of the few random policy 
interventions salient to this field of enquiry is provided by Nagin and others (2002). They 
find that randomized changes in monitoring regimes can reduce worker effort. Azfar and 
Nelson (2002) develop a game designed to explore the effect on presidential resource 
                                                 
4 They find that students who study economics and men are more corrupt on average. But male 
economists are the most while male non-economists are the least corrupt. They also suggest that the higher 
corruption of economics students on average is a consequence of self-selection rather than indoctrination.   5
expropriation of a division of power between an attorney-general and a president. They 
find that making an attorney-general separately answerable to the electorate reduces 
corruption significantly. 
Another advantage of experiments is that they provide us with insights relating to 
other-regarding preferences and the crowding-out effects of external incentives. 
However, this has not been directly linked to the issue of corruption in the existing 
experiments. In very different games, Fehr and Gachter (2000); Cardenas, Stranlund, and 
Willis (2000); and Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) show that external incentives can 
crowd out co-operation, trust, and reciprocity. However, according to Fehr and Falk 
(2002) there is no conclusive evidence relating to the crowding out of intrinsic motivation 
as defined by Kreps (1997).  
3.  The Public Servant’s Game 
3.1   Overview of the Game 
We designed the Public Servant’s game to mimic the incentives faced by public 
servants in developing countries. The game bears some similarities to the Attorney-
General’s game, designed by Azfar and Nelson (2002). In our experiment the game 
focuses on the decision-making environment faced by health workers and those 
appointed to monitor their performance. However, with only minor adjustments the game 
can be adapted to resemble the environment of other agent-types that are of interest to 
policy-makers.  
The game involves eight players, who at different times may play the role of 
community member, health worker or monitor. The basic idea of the game is as follows. 
A health worker is randomly selected to serve a community. The health worker rolls a die 
to see how many resources (time, skills, drugs, bandages, syringes, etc.) she has at her 
disposal. The health worker then chooses how many of these resources to keep for herself 
and how many to pass on to the community. The performance of this health worker, i.e., 
her tendency to pass the resources on to the community rather than keeping them for 
herself, is monitored by an individual who is either elected by the community or 
randomly selected. The monitor chooses how much effort to put into the task of 
monitoring. His monitoring activity consists of trying to expose how many resources the 
health worker has kept for herself rather than passed on to the community. If the health 
worker is found to have kept resources, she looses all the resources she has kept and is 
excluded from being the health worker in the next round of the game (each game has 12 
rounds). Then another round of the game begins. For a health worker who is not exposed 
as keeping resources, the probability of retaining her role is significantly higher than the   6
probability of any other player becoming the health worker. Summarized, there are three 
decision variables in the experiment:  
(i)  Health workers have to decide whether to try and keep resources for 
themselves, and if so how many.  
(ii)  Monitors have to decide how much effort (or money) to put into trying to 
expose the health workers.  
(iii)  Depending on the rules of the specific version of the game, community 
members have to decide whether to replace or re-elect the monitor. 
In the experiment, we vary four factors by design in order to see how they affect 
the decision variables described above. The four treatment variables are:  
(a)  The wage of the health worker, which is set high or low. (The high wage is 
equal to the upper limit of what a recipient community member can earn in a 
round of the game; the low wage is only marginally above the lower limit and 
significantly below the upper limit of what a recipient community member 
can earn.)  
(b)  The difficulty of hiding the expropriated resources, which is set high or low. 
(Variation is created by altering the relative amount of resources that are 
controlled by the health worker.) 
(c)  The relationship between the monitor and the community: randomly selected 
or elected by the community. 
(d)  Whether the game is framed or not. In the framed version players in the health 
worker and community member roles are referred to in that way. In the non-
framed version they are given abstract labels. 
With the resulting data we can test the following six hypotheses: 
1.  Ceteris paribus, public servants who receive a higher wage expropriate less 
than public servants who receive a lower wage.  
2.  Ceteris paribus, when the activities of the public servant are more readily 
observed, public servants expropriate fewer resources. 
3.  Ceteris paribus, monitors who are representatives of recipient communities 
put greater effort into monitoring those public servants posted to the 
community. 
4.  Ceteris paribus, monitors will put more effort into exposing expropriation by 
public servants who are receiving a high wage than they will into exposing 
expropriation by public servants who are getting a lower wage. 
5.  Ceteris paribus, when faced with community representative monitors, public 
servants expropriate fewer resources.   7
6.  Ceteris paribus, there is a professional culture of caring and public service that 
acts as a motivation for members of the caring professions to use the 
resources at their disposal to serve the communities within which they live.  
3.2   Details of the Game 
Each experimental session involves one set of eight players. On arrival, the 
players are assigned participant numbers from 1 to 8. The game begins when one player 
is selected to be the health worker according to the roll of an eight-sided die. The health 
worker is referred to as player P in the abstract treatment.  
In the random monitor treatment, the eight-sided die is then rolled to select the 
monitor. If the health worker’s number comes up the die is rolled again. In the elected 
monitor treatment, die rolls are used to select two candidates for the position of monitor. 
The five players whose numbers have not come up in the die rolling become voting 
community members. In the abstract treatment they are referred to as player Cs. They 
each cast a secret ballot by writing the number of the candidate they want to be their 
representative monitor on a piece of paper. The ballots are collected by the experimenter, 
the votes are tallied, and the winner announced and appointed as monitor. The 
unsuccessful candidate becomes the sixth ordinary community member or player C. The 
monitor is always referred to as monitor, both in the abstract and framed treatment 
(referred to as M in Figure 1). 
The health worker (P) sits at the head of the table and unconditionally earns 20 
Birr in the low-wage treatment and 60 Birr in the high-wage treatment.
5 The monitor 
takes the chair to the left of the health worker and the ordinary community members take 
the remaining chairs (see Figure 1). The health worker then rolls a 6-sided die in private 
and receives the same number of valuable tiles as the number rolled. These valuable tiles 
are mixed with the appropriate number of worthless tiles to bring the total number of tiles 
to either 10 or 18. This variation determines the difficulty of exposing resources that the 
health worker keeps. All the tiles are placed on a pad in front of the health worker who is 
sitting behind a screen. The health worker can see which tiles are valuable and which are 
not, but the community members and monitor cannot. Thus, the health worker is the only 
player with full information regarding the tiles. The health worker decides how many 
valuable tiles to keep and how many to distribute to the community. She indicates her 
allocation decision by placing 6 chosen tiles (all valuable, all worthless, or a mixture) in a 
bag to distribute to the community members. While doing this she is careful not to reveal 
the tile types to the other players. The remaining tiles are left on the pad. The community 
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members and monitor do not know how many valuable tiles are in the bag and how many 
have been kept on the pad by the health worker.  
Before the tiles in the bag are passed on to the community members, the monitor 
can attempt to expose valuable tiles that the health worker has kept. The pad, containing 
the tiles the health worker keeps, is presented to the monitor, with the tiles turned over so 
it is unclear which tiles are valuable and which not. Then the pad is placed in the middle 
of the table so that it can be seen by all. The monitor first states how many tiles he wishes 
to turn over. He can turn over zero, one, two, three, or four tiles. Each tile turned costs 5 
Birr and the total cost is based on the number of tiles the monitor states that he is going to 
turn. The monitor receives 60 Birr. Any money remaining after the tile turning is the 
monitor’s earnings for the round. So, his earnings will be 60 Birr, 55 Birr, 50 Birr, 45 
Birr, or 40 Birr depending on whether he declares that he is going to turn zero, one, two, 
three, or four tiles respectively. Once he has stated how many he is going to turn, he 
chooses which to turn, thereby exposing to all players whether they are valuable or 
worthless. 
Finally, the bag containing the tiles that the health worker allocated to the 
community is passed around the table so that each community member can blindly draw 
a tile. They learn the identity of their own tile, but are not told what other community 
members draw. Some information may be communicated through community member’s 
reactions to their draw, but this does not affect the nature of the game. Even if the identity 
of all the drawn tiles becomes public, the communities’ knowledge of the health worker’s 
behaviour still increases with the number of tiles turned by the monitor. 
Each valuable tile is worth 60 Birr to the community member that draws it. To the 
health worker, each valuable tile that she keeps is worth 40 Birr as long as no valuable 
tiles are exposed by the monitor. If valuable tiles are exposed, all the valuable tiles that 
the health worker has kept become worthless. Accordingly, corruption causes a dead 
weight loss of 33.3 percent if not exposed and 100 percent if exposed.  
Once all the community members have drawn a tile, that round is finished, and 
the next round begins. If the incumbent health worker has been exposed as keeping 
resources, the 8-sided die is used to select the health worker for the next round and if the 
number of the incumbent health worker comes up, the die is cast again. If the health 
worker has not been exposed as keeping resources, a 14-sided spinner is used to select the 
health worker for the next round. 8 sides of this spinner are numbered and 6 are marked 
incumbent. If the spinner settles on either the incumbent health worker’s number or one 
of the ‘incumbent’ sides, the incumbent health worker remains in post. So, the probability 
that the health worker remains in post for another round is 0.5. If the spinner settles on   9
another number then the corresponding player becomes the health worker for the next 
round. 
The same procedure for appointing the health worker is followed in the random 
and elected monitor treatment. However, while in the random treatment the incumbent 
monitor can be selected to become the health worker, in the elected monitor treatment she 
cannot. This is because, in the elected monitor treatment she has to stand for re-election. 
So, if the spinner settles on the incumbent monitor’s number it is spun again. 
Once the health worker for the next round has been appointed attention turns to 
the appointment of the monitor. In the random monitor treatment the 8-sided die is rolled 
as before. In the elected monitor treatment a second candidate for the monitor role is 
selected using the 8-sided die. The incumbent monitor and this newly selected candidate 
then run for election. The successful candidate becomes the monitor. Then, play 
progresses as before. 
Each session involves one game comprising of 12 rounds. Table 1 contains a step-
by-step summary of the game. The total number of tiles placed on the pad in front of the 
health worker is kept constant at either 10 or 18 for the first six rounds and then changes 
to the other level for the remaining six rounds.  
A participant’s pay is determined by their earnings in one of the 12 rounds. This 
pay round is randomly and openly determined in front of the participants at the end of the 
experiment, using a 12-sided die. We based pay on a randomly selected round rather than 
cumulative earnings to minimize income effects. Payments are calculated with reference 
to the data collected during play and placed in envelopes. The participants sign to verify 
payment, and fill out a questionnaire, and a list of general questions regarding the 
experiment.  
3.3   Experimental Design and Implementation 
We ran 16 experimental sessions. In eight of these sessions we minimized the 
extent to which the game was framed. We did not use the terms ‘health worker’, 
‘community members’, or ‘resources’. The health worker was referred to as ‘Player P’, 
the community members were referred to as ‘Player C’s, and valuable tiles were simply 
referred to as such. In the other eight sessions we framed the game strongly. Not only did 
we use the labels ‘health worker’ and ‘community members’, but when introducing the 
valuable tiles we drew an analogy between them and resources such as bandages, 
syringes, and drugs, sent by the central government. Further, the gathering of all eight 
players around the table was likened to a village community and the screen erected 
around the ‘health worker’ was referred to as ‘the clinic’.    10
In four out of each of these two sets of eight sessions, the monitor was randomly 
selected and in the other four the monitor was elected. In four sessions the ‘health 
worker’ was paid the lower wage and in the other four he or she was paid the higher 
wage. Finally, in four sessions the first six rounds were played with high observability 
(10 tiles on the pad) and the second six were played with low observability (18 tiles on 
the pad). And in the remaining four, the six low-observability games preceded the high-
observability ones. 
The design ensured that the resulting sample of 192 game rounds was balanced 
with respect to all four treatment variables and that the variation in each was orthogonal 
to the variation in all of the others (see Table 2 for the session plan). It would also have 
ensured a balanced sample with respect to the order of the levels of observability, 
however during implementation, instead of conducting sessions 15 and 16 we repeated 
sessions 13 and 14 by accident. This error had implications for the way in which we 
check for order effects relating to the observability results, but affects none of our 
conclusions.  
4.  Context and External Validity 
The research questions addressed in the game are highly pertinent to the Ethiopian 
context. Health outcomes and health service indicators in Ethiopia are among the worst in 
the world. Even after a decade of concerted efforts to expand access to health care, health 
worker/population ratios remain three to four times lower in Ethiopia than in neighboring 
countries. According to policy makers, experts and health workers themselves corruption 
and inappropriate behaviour are rife in the health sector (Lindelöw and Serneels 2003). 
Health workers claim that equipment, drugs, and other material are often removed from 
public facilities for sale or use in private practice, and that absenteeism, motivated by a 
desire to augment income by providing health care privately, is commonplace.  
Formally, the monitoring and sanctioning of health workers is the responsibility 
of the district governments. However, requisite capacity is often lacking, especially in 
more remote areas, where monitoring is also inherently difficult. The smallest, most local 
administrative units (urban dwellers’ and peasants’ associations) have a semi-formal 
monitoring role, although contact between these community organizations and health 
workers is often limited in practice.  
In what way does the experiment help us understand the Ethiopian reality? This 
question about external validity is both pertinent and difficult to answer. It is a question 
about whether subjects play in the laboratory as real life. The final answer to this can 
only come from empirical observation. But in the absence of agent-level quantitative   11
analyses, one possible answer is that experimental results are the best we can offer at this 
present. At the same time this should not lead to complacency. In the implementation of 
this experiment we made a conscious choice to implement the experiment “in the field”. 
This is an important step towards improving external validity. Subject type matters: 
players bring an entire set of heuristics, values and expectations, which affect the way 
they play, as argued by Cardenas (2003) and Harrison and List (2003). We have made 
three conscious choices in this regard. First of all we implemented the game in Ethiopia. 
This allows us to play the game with Ethiopians in their cultural home environment. If 
cultural norms affect how agents play a game, as shown by Henrich and others (2001), 
implementing the game in Ethiopia gives experimental results that are closer to the 
Ethiopian reality. Second, we played the game with Ethiopian nursing students, who will 
ultimately work in the Ethiopian health sector. So if nursing students have a specific 
profile—say for example that they have a higher intrinsic motivation – this will be 
reflected in our experimental results. Third, we play both an abstract and a concrete 
version of the game. This allows us to investigate whether and to what extent the specific 
context of the health sector affects the way the game is played.  
5. Results 
Our understanding of the results can be improved by working backwards; to gain 
insights relating to the motivations of monitors it is useful to first look at community 
members’ voting behaviour. Similarly, to gain insights about the motivations of ‘health 
workers’ it is useful to have first looked at the monitors’ behaviour. Therefore, in this 
section we first look at community voting behaviour, then at monitoring behaviour, and 
finally at the behaviour of the health worker.  
5.1   Community Voting Behaviour  
During the experiment a total of 96 elections were held (12 in each of eight 
sessions). Of these, eight elections were between new candidates in the first round of the 
game. In the remaining 88, one candidate had been monitor during the preceding round. 
In Figure 2 community members’ votes of the incumbent monitor are plotted against the 
number of tiles turned over by that monitor just prior to the election, i.e., how much effort 
or money he put into monitoring. The upper half of the figure contains a scatter plot and 
the lower half contains a bar chart of mean votes for each level of monitoring effort. Both 
graphs suggest that monitors who make more effort are more likely to be re-elected. The 
statistical significance of this result is indicated by the regression in the first column of 
Table 3. The second and third columns of this table indicate that neither the success of   12
the monitor at exposing an embezzling ‘health worker’ nor any of the other treatment 
variables like the wage level or the level of observability affects voting behaviour.  
5.2   Monitoring Behaviour  
Figure 3 contains a histogram of the tiles turned by the monitors in each of the 
192 rounds. The distribution of monitoring effort has a single mode at one tile, although 
nearly one third of the sample turned none and only slightly fewer turned two. It was 
relatively rare for monitors to turn three or four tiles. Table 4 indicates that the mean 
number of tiles turned is 1.28; and that this varies across treatments.  
Figure 4 displays the histograms and cumulative distributions of the numbers of 
tiles turned under the different treatments. Starting at the top of Table 4 and Figure 4 we 
see that the randomly selected monitors turned fewer tiles than the elected monitors. The 
mean numbers of tiles turned were 0.72 and 1.84 respectively and the modes were zero 
and two respectively. In contrast, varying observability left the mean number of tiles 
turned unchanged. Both Table 4 and the third row of graphs in Figure 4 indicate that the 
monitors exerted more effort, i.e., turned more tiles, when the health workers were paid 
the high wage. The mean numbers of tiles turned in the low and high wage treatments 
were 1.04 and 1.52 respectively and the modes were zero and one. Finally, the effects of 
framing the experiment are less straightforward. The mean numbers of tiles turned in the 
abstract and framed treatments were very similar, 1.30 and 1.26 respectively, but the 
modes were distinct at one and zero respectively. Further, framing was associated with a 
significant increase in the variance of monitoring effort (1 percent level in a two-tailed 
variance ratio test). 
We explore the statistical significance of these treatment effects using regression 
analysis. The regressions in Table 5 indicate that the wage received by the ‘health 
workers’ had a positive and significant (5 percent level) effect on the monitors’ 
behaviour. Ceteris paribus, according to the regression in column 1 of Table 5, if the 
health worker received 60 Birr rather than 20 Birr, the monitor turned an additional 0.478 
tiles. How the monitor is selected also has a significant (1 percent level) effect on his own 
behaviour. According to the regression in the first column of Table 5, elected monitors 
turned more tiles than the randomly selected monitors. However, when we enter an 
interaction term between Monitor elected (E) and Observability (OH) in the second 
column, it is also significant. When observability was low, ceteris paribus, an elected 
monitor turned 0.839 tiles more than a randomly selected one and when observability was 
high, ceteris paribus, they turned 1.411 tiles more. Further, when monitors were 
randomly selected, changing the level of observability had no impact on the number of 
tiles they turned. No other interaction effects between treatment variables were identified.   13
5.3   Health Worker Behaviour 
Figure 5 contains a histogram of the tiles retained by the ‘health worker’ in each 
of the 192 rounds. The distribution of embezzlement has a single mode at one tile. In over 
one-fifth of the rounds no tiles were retained, while in a similar proportion two were 
retained, and in nearly a quarter three or more tiles were retained. Table 6 indicates that 
the mean number of tiles retained was 1.61. It also shows how the mean number of tiles 
retained varies across treatments.  
Figure 6 displays the histograms and cumulative distributions of the numbers of 
tiles retained under the different treatments. Starting at the top of Table 6 and Figure 6 we 
see that when the monitors were randomly selected the ‘health workers’ retained more 
tiles than when the monitors were elected. The mean numbers of tiles retained were 1.96 
and 1.27 respectively. The second row of graphs in Figure 6 indicates that observability 
also had an impact. When observability was high health workers retained fewer tiles than 
when it was low. The mean numbers of tiles retained were 1.36 and 1.86 respectively. 
Both Table 6 and the third row of graphs in Figure 6 indicate that when health workers 
were paid more they retained fewer tiles. The mean numbers of tiles retained in the low 
and high wage treatments were 1.90 and 1.33 respectively. Finally, the effects of framing 
are complex once again. The mean numbers of tiles retained in the abstract and framed 
treatments were very similar, 1.66 and 1.57 respectively, even though the modes were 
distinct at one and zero respectively. And again framing seems to significantly increase (5 
percent level) the variance in behaviour. 
We can explore the statistical significance of these treatment effects using 
regression analysis. The regressions in Table 7 indicate that the ‘health workers’ 
expropriated more when they received more. Re-running the regressions using the 
number of valuable tiles retained divided by the number of valuable tiles received as the 
dependent variable (results not reported) revealed that the proportion of valuable tiles 
retained remained stable or declined very marginally as the number of valuable tiles 
received by the ‘health worker’ increased. Ceteris paribus, ‘health workers’ facing 
elected monitors retained 0.683 fewer tiles (significant at 1 percent level), ‘health 
workers’ that received a wage of 60 Birr rather than 20 Birr retained 0.489 fewer tiles 
(significant at 5 percent), and when observability was high the ‘health worker’ retained 
0.452 fewer tiles. Finally, ceteris paribus, the number of tiles retained by the health 
workers tended to increase as the games progressed. No interaction effects between 
treatment variables can be identified.   14
6. Conclusions 
From the literature we identified three possible causes of corruption: (i) poor 
public servant pay; (ii) the monitorability and sanctionability of public servants and the 
interests of those charged with monitoring and sanctioning; and (iii) the intrinsic, internal, 
or personal motivations of public servants. We then designed an experiment that enabled 
us to test six hypotheses relating to these causes. The game at the heart of this experiment 
mimics a situation in which a public servant receives resources and chooses how many to 
pass on to the community. The public servant’s behaviour is observed by a monitor. Here 
we review our results relating to each of the hypotheses. 
Two of our hypotheses relate to the effect of poor public servant pay. Our results 
suggest that public servants who receive a higher wage expropriate less. However, in 
accordance with the findings of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), the effect is small; a 
200% increase in wages leads to only a 30% reduction in resource expropriation. Unlike 
those working with cross-country data sets, we were also able to explore the effect of the 
pay of public servants on the effort of those charged with the duty of monitoring them. 
Here we found that monitors put more effort into exposing expropriation by public 
servants who are receiving a higher wage. This corroborates Abbink’s (2002a) 
observation that distributive fairness considerations cause well-paid public officials to 
behave less corruptly. 
Turning to our hypotheses relating to the institutional environment of monitoring, 
like Azfar and Nelson’s (2002) presidents, we find that public servants expropriate fewer 
resources when faced with community representative monitors; and monitors who are 
elected representatives put greater effort into monitoring public servants. We also find 
that public servants expropriate fewer resources when observability is higher; and that 
community members re-elect monitors who put more effort (money) into exposing 
expropriation. What our results cannot tell us is how observability might decline as we 
move from professional to community representative monitoring due to the change in the 
capacity to monitor in real contexts. This notwithstanding, the strength of the ‘democracy 
effect’ is worthy of note by those interested in policy in this area. 
Finally, our experimental design allows us to explore the effect of a particular 
type of personal or intrinsic motivations. By framing the game we endeavoured to 
activate any context- or profession-specific behavioural norms. We observe no effect 
resulting from this framing in either mean monitoring or mean expropriating behaviour. 
This suggests that there is no commonly shared context-specific or professional culture of 
caring pertaining to our subject pool. However, framing did significantly increase the 
variance in both monitoring and expropriating behaviour. This suggests that different   15
subject sub-groups were variably motivated by the invoked context. As part of our 
ongoing work programme we are endeavouring to identify these sub-groups. 
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Table and Figures 
 
TABLE 1 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE GAME 
Monitor is an associate of the health worker   Monitor is a community representative 
1. Health worker selected using 8-sided die  Health worker selected using 8-sided die 
2. Monitor selected using 8-sided die  2 candidates for monitor selected using 8-sided die and 
community votes to elect one 
3. Health worker rolls a 6-sided die to determine the 
number of valuable tiles (resources) she gets 
Health worker rolls a 6-sided die to determine the 
number of valuable tiles (resources) she gets 
4. Health worker decides how many valuable tiles to 
keep 
Health worker decides how many valuable tiles to keep 
5. Monitor states how many tiles (0 to 4) he is going to 
turn in order to try and expose a valuable tile (resources) 
that the health worker has kept. Then he turns 
Monitor states how many tiles (0 to 4) he is going to 
turn in order to try and expose a valuable tile 
(resources) that the health worker has kept. Then he 
turns 
6. If the monitor exposes a valuable tile, the health 
worker loses all the valuable tiles he has kept, and is 
excluded from being HW in the next round 
If the monitor exposes a valuable tile, the health worker 
loses all the valuable tiles he has kept, and is excluded 
from being HW in the next round 
7. Six tiles including all the valuable tiles that the health 
worker has not kept are randomly distributed to the six 
community members 
Six tiles including all the valuable tiles that the health 
worker has not kept are randomly distributed to the six 
community members 
8. If incumbent HW is exposed, start again at 1. If 
incumbent HW’s numbers come up, roll again. 
 If incumbent HW not exposed, select HW for next round 
using 14-sided spinner - incumbent remains if own 
number or ‘incumbent’ comes up.  
 
If incumbent HW is exposed, roll 8-sided die to select 
new HW. If incumbent HW’s or monitor’s numbers 
come up, roll again. 
If incumbent HW not exposed, select HW for next 
round using 14-sided spinner - incumbent remains if 
own number or ‘incumbent’ comes up. If incumbent 
monitor’s number comes up, spin again  
9. Continue at 3.  Incumbent monitor faces reelection. Roll 8-sided die to 
select the other candidate. Continue at 2.  
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TABLE 2 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: SESSIONS 





rounds 1 - 6  rounds 7 - 12 
Health worker 
wage 
1  Abstract  Random  Low (18 tiles)  High (10 tiles)  Low (20 Birr) 
2  Abstract  Random  Low (18 tiles)  High (10 tiles)  High (60 Birr) 
3  Abstract  Random  High (10 tiles)  Low (18 tiles)  Low (20 Birr) 
4  Abstract  Random  High (10 tiles)  Low (18 tiles)  High (60 Birr) 
5  Abstract  Representative  Low (18 tiles)  High (10 tiles)  Low (20 Birr) 
6  Abstract  Representative  Low (18 tiles)  High (10 tiles)  High (60 Birr) 
7  Abstract  Representative  High (10 tiles)  Low (18 tiles)  Low (20 Birr) 
8  Abstract  Representative  High (10 tiles)  Low (18 tiles)  High (60 Birr) 
9  Framed  Random  Low (18 tiles)  High (10 tiles)  Low (20 Birr) 
10  Framed  Random  Low (18 tiles)  High (10 tiles)  High (60 Birr) 
11  Framed  Random  High (10 tiles)  Low (18 tiles)  Low (20 Birr) 
12  Framed  Random  High (10 tiles)  Low (18 tiles)  High (60 Birr) 
13  Framed  Representative  Low (18 tiles)  High (10 tiles)  Low (20 Birr) 
14  Framed  Representative  Low (18 tiles)  High (10 tiles)  High (60 Birr) 
15*  Framed  Representative  High (10 tiles)  Low (18 tiles)  Low (20 Birr) 
16*  Framed  Representative  High (10 tiles)  Low (18 tiles)  High (60 Birr) 
* Planned but not implemented (see text). 
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TABLE 3 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF VOTES FOR INCUMBENT MONITORS 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Constant 0.710 0.222 ** 0.710 0.223 ** 0.635 0.157 ***
Tiles turned 0.408 0.077 *** 0.417 0.093 *** 0.435 0.073 ***
Resources exposed -0.035 0.184
Wage high -0.396 0.282
Observability high 0.341 0.246
Abstract 0.086 0.266
Observations 88 88 88
R-squared 0.129 0.129 0.173  
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the cluster command in Stata with 
reference to the session within which the round was played.  
 
TABLE 4 
MONITORING OF ‘PUBLIC SERVICE PROVIDERS’ 
Tiles turned… n Mean Standard dev.
Full sample  192 1.28 1.13
Monitor randomly selected 96 0.72 0.79
Monitor elected 96 1.84 1.14
Observability high 96 1.28 1.19
Observability low 96 1.28 1.07
Wage low 96 1.04 1.09
Wage high 96 1.52 1.11
Abstract 96 1.30 0.96
Framed 96 1.26 1.28  
 
TABLE 5 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MONITORING OF ‘PUBLIC SERVICE PROVIDERS’ 
 Dependent variable = number of tiles turned by monitor 
 Coef. s.e.  Coef. s.e. 
Constant 0.480 0.221 ** 0.672 0.260 **
Resource -0.005 0.035 -0.004 0.035
Monitor elected (E) 1.125 0.217 *** 0.839 0.276 ***
Wage high 0.478 0.214 ** 0.479 0.214 **
Observability high (OH) 0.000 0.137 -0.271 0.161
Abstract 0.042 0.219 0.042 0.219
Round (continuous) -0.001 0.017 -0.010 0.016
E x OH 0.572 0.247 **
Observations 192 192
R-squared 0.296 0.311  
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the 
cluster command in Stata with reference to the session within which the 
round was played. The round counter was included in these regressions 
to control for order effect. No such effects were found.  
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TABLE 6 
RESOURCES RETAINED BY ‘PUBLIC SERVICE PROVIDERS’ 
Tiles retained n Mean Standard dev.
Full sample  192 1.61 1.34
Monitor randomly selected 96 1.96 1.35
Monitor elected 96 1.27 1.24
Observability high 96 1.36 1.21
Observability low 96 1.86 1.42
Wage low 96 1.90 1.36
Wage high 96 1.33 1.26
Abstract 96 1.66 1.19




REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF TILES RETAINED BY ‘PUBLIC SERVICE PROVIDERS’ 
Dependent variable = tiles retained by provider 
Coef. s.e. 
Constant 0.831 0.240 ***
Resource 0.413 0.037 ***
Monitor elected -0.683 0.177 ***
Wage high -0.489 0.175 **
Observability high -0.506 0.115 ***
Abstract 0.027 0.177
Round (continuous) 0.035 0.020 *
Observations 192
R-squared 0.428  
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using the cluster command in Stata 
with reference to the session within which the round was 
played. 
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FIGURE 5 
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FIGURE 6 
RESOURCES RETAINED BY ‘PUBLIC SERVICE PROVIDERS’ UNDER DIFFERENT TREATMENTS 
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